Rule of Specialty After Extradition

Does the new allegation concern conduct before surrender?

Start with the date of the alleged conduct, not the date investigators discovered it. Article 14 of the 1957 European Convention on Extradition and Article 27 of the EU European Arrest Warrant (EAW) Framework Decision protect, within their respective scopes, against specified proceedings or liberty restrictions for a different offence committed before extradition or surrender. They do not automatically immunise conduct committed afterwards, and they do not erase the receiving state's criminal jurisdiction. They restrict how that jurisdiction may be exercised for earlier conduct outside the approved scope.

For example, a person surrendered on a specified fraud allegation may later face a separate, earlier bribery count. The fact that both counts appear in one investigation does not decide the issue. Compare the facts and legal basis in the original request or EAW with the operative surrender decision, including any exclusions or undertakings. Conversely, a new legal label for substantially the same conduct may not amount to a different offence. The result depends on the governing instrument and the facts, not the heading of the indictment alone.

Specialty is not the same as provisional arrest. Provisional arrest concerns urgent custody before the full extradition request or surrender process is completed; it does not determine which earlier offences may be pursued after surrender. See provisional arrest and provisional warrants for that earlier stage, and cross-border arrest and surrender for challenges to the transfer itself.

Which document sets the limits?

Obtain the original extradition request or EAW, supporting factual statement, any amended request, the final surrender decision, and any conditions or diplomatic assurances. An arrest notice or international alert does not by itself show which offences the requested state approved. The final decision may cover fewer allegations than the initial request. Compare the operative text and the conduct described in each document; arrange reliable translations where necessary.

For traditional extradition under the 1957 Convention, Article 14 is the starting point unless a later protocol or another applicable treaty changes the rule. The Fourth Additional Protocol (CETS No. 212) replaces Article 14 between the parties to which it applies. Article 11 limits its temporal application to requests received after the Protocol entered into force between the states concerned. Therefore, participation in the original Convention alone does not establish that the Protocol's 90-day consent period or 30-day departure period applies. Check each state's participation, declarations, reservations and the date the request was received.

For an EAW between EU Member States, Article 27 of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA applies. The EAW and its Article 8 description of the offence are central. In Leymann and Pustovarov (C-388/08 PPU, 1 December 2008), the Court of Justice explained how the competent national court compares the offence described in the warrant with the later charge. A factual change does not necessarily create a different offence if it does not alter the essential nature of the offence and does not introduce a ground for non-execution; a materially different earlier offence may require consent under Article 27(4).

Stage map: what triggers review, who acts, and what must be preserved?

This map is not a universal list of courts or filing deadlines. The receiving state's law determines the named court, available motion, appeal route and interim relief. If a custody hearing or new-charge hearing is imminent, counsel should raise the issue in that proceeding and immediately confirm the local deadline triggered by the relevant notice, order or hearing. The 30-day EAW and TCA consent-decision periods and, where applicable, the 90-day Fourth Protocol period concern inter-state consent decisions; none is a general deadline for a defendant to challenge detention.

Which exception or waiver may permit the added offence?

These routes are separate and should not be merged. Under EAW Article 27(4), the original executing judicial authority must decide a consent request no later than 30 days after receiving it. Consent must be refused on Article 3 grounds and may otherwise be refused only on Article 4 grounds. Article 27(4) does not set a universal 30-day deadline for a defendant's motion, and it does not make the issuing prosecutor the decision-maker.

In OE v Minister for Justice and Equality (C-142/22, 6 July 2023), the Court of Justice held that the fact that the original EAW was issued by a body that was not an “issuing judicial authority” under Article 6(1) does not, by itself, prevent the executing judicial authority from later consenting under Article 27(3)(g) and (4) to prosecution, sentence or deprivation of liberty for another offence committed before surrender. The authority must check the Article 8 information and translation, whether the added offence is itself subject to surrender, and the refusal grounds in Articles 3 and 4. The consent procedure is not a route to reopen the final decision on the original surrender. Any challenge to that decision must be assessed separately under the applicable national review rules; it should not be assumed to block a later consent request automatically.

Under the unmodified 1957 Convention, Article 14 does not set a comparable 90-day decision period. Where the Fourth Additional Protocol applies between the two states, its revised Article 14 requires a decision as soon as possible and no later than 90 days after receipt of the consent request. If that period cannot be met, the requested Party must give reasons for the delay and estimate the time needed. The Protocol also changes the post-final-discharge period to 30 days. Check the request date and the Protocol's entry into force between the states before relying on either change.

For the departure exception, “final discharge” and a genuine opportunity to leave are factual and legal questions. Preserve the release date, any continuing detention or restrictions, travel documents, evidence of whether lawful departure was possible, and exit or return records. A brief release under conditions may not be the same as final discharge. Under the Fourth Protocol, pre-trial investigation may continue, but measures restricting personal freedom are generally prohibited unless the specific matching-declaration procedure in Article 3(3) applies. That procedure is conditional; an objection by the surrendering state requires the restriction to end immediately.

Can the prosecution avoid specialty by renaming the charge?

No. The legal label is relevant but not decisive. Under Leymann and Pustovarov, the competent national court compares the offence and facts covered by the EAW with the later allegation. A correction to the time, place or detail of conduct may remain within the original offence if its essential nature is unchanged and the modification does not create a new ground for non-execution. A separate transaction, a materially different course of conduct or a new earlier offence may require fresh consent. The court must work from the warrant, the surrender decision and the charging facts—not just the name of the offence.

For a conventional extradition, Article 14(3) of the original Convention and Article 3(4) of the Fourth Protocol also address a changed description: the offence under its new description must, by its constituent elements, remain an offence that would permit extradition. Do not assume that every amendment is prohibited, or that a changed label automatically cures a mismatch.

What do later surrender and the 2026 EU–UK judgment change?

In XC (C-195/20 PPU, 24 September 2020), the Court of Justice held that when a person voluntarily leaves the state after the first EAW process and is later surrendered under a second EAW, specialty linked to the first surrender may no longer govern the later measure. The analysis includes the Article 27(3)(a) final-discharge and opportunity-to-leave exception: establish the actual discharge date, whether there was a genuine opportunity to leave, and any departure or return. On the facts of XC, consent from the executing judicial authority for the second EAW was sufficient; the state responsible for the first surrender did not also have to consent. The ruling is fact-specific and does not mean that any second warrant removes every specialty protection.

On onward surrender, EAW Article 28 is a different rule. In West (C-192/12 PPU, 28 June 2012), the Court addressed the chain of successive EAWs and the consent required for another transfer. Do not use Article 28 to answer whether a receiving state may prosecute an added count under Article 27.

For EU–UK surrender, the relevant instrument is the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), not the intra-EU EAW Framework Decision. Article 625 contains its own specialty regime.

Under TCA Article 625(1), the UK and the EU (acting on behalf of a Member State) may notify the Specialised Committee on Law Enforcement and Judicial Cooperation that consent is presumed, in relations covered by matching notifications, for prosecution, sentencing or detention to carry out a custodial sentence or detention order for a different pre-surrender offence, unless the executing judicial authority states otherwise in the surrender decision. Check the notifications in force and the exact wording of that decision. A later consent request under Article 625(3)(g)–(4) is a separate procedure and must be decided within 30 days after receipt; a person's waiver is distinct and is governed by Article 611. The request must include the information and translation required by Article 606; consent is due if the added offence is itself subject to surrender under the TCA. Consent must be refused on Article 600 grounds and may otherwise be refused only on Articles 601, 602(2) or 603(2), with any guarantees required by Article 604.

In LQ and Others v Minister for Justice and Equality (C-528/24, 23 April 2026, the case file also uses the fictitious label Boothnesse), the Court held that a six-month sentence for contempt of court—treated as civil rather than criminal under UK law and not covered by the TCA arrest warrants—did not, by itself, allow the Irish executing authority to refuse surrender. The Court said specialty is a procedural guarantee, not a fundamental right in itself. But Article 47 of the EU Charter requires an effective judicial remedy in the issuing state after surrender where Article 625 would otherwise bar prosecution, sentencing or detention. If there is a concrete concern that no effective remedy exists, the executing authority must examine the fundamental-rights issue; in case of doubt, it should seek information about available remedies and any necessary assurances. The judgment is not a blanket rule that specialty never matters before surrender.

Where should an objection be raised?

The usual first step is to raise the issue before the receiving state's criminal court dealing with the added charge or the custody decision. Depending on local law, counsel may seek to prevent the additional count proceeding, ask for an adjournment while consent is sought, challenge a liberty restriction, or appeal a later ruling. None of these remedies is automatic. A specialty objection to one count also does not necessarily invalidate charges already covered by the surrender decision or remove an independent legal basis for detention.

Where inter-state consent is required, counsel should separately identify the authority in the surrendering state that decides the request and any procedure for making submissions or challenging that decision. There is no universal specialty court or filing deadline across all treaties. The applicable treaty, both states' declarations, domestic implementing law, the exact order and binding appellate decisions in the competent jurisdiction must be checked. The Court of Justice may interpret EU law through a reference from a national court; an individual does not ordinarily file a direct specialty appeal there.

What should counsel collect when the charge expands?

• The legal route: both states, the physical surrender date, the applicable treaty and protocols, or the EAW/TCA instrument; relevant reservations, declarations and notifications.
• The authorised scope: original request or warrant, supporting facts, amended versions, final surrender decision and any condition limiting prosecution.
• The new allegation: old and new charging documents, case numbers, dates of conduct, comparison of offence elements and any custody or sentencing order.
• Consent or waiver: the formal extension request, proof of receipt, decision, translations, the person's recorded statement and any express waiver with the record of legal advice.
• Discharge and travel: custody and release records, restrictions still in force, ability to leave, travel documents, and exit or return evidence.
• Procedural next step: next hearing date, the local filing deadline and its trigger, the court with jurisdiction, and copies of objections already made.

For related issues about the initial EAW process rather than post-surrender limits on additional charges, see European Arrest Warrant representation.

For a document-specific assessment of an added charge after surrender, send the surrender decision, the original and new charging documents, and the next hearing date through the confidential request form. This is general legal information, not an opinion on an individual case.